Chapter 4 Case Study: Athletics Australia

Introduction

This case study should be read in conjunction with chapter ? in ?, as it provides a point of comparison against which we can explore the experiences of two major non-governmental organisations involved in sports development in different countries. Both this case study and the analysis of UK Athletics in ? explore the nature of NGBs’ changing relationships with government. Both analyses reveal that, before the 1970s in Australia and the UK, government provided intermittent if limited support for sport (Green and Houlihan, 2005). When support was provided, it was largely channelled through local government authorities. In Australia during the 1940s and 1950s, for example, Stewart et al. (2004, pp. 42-3) note that ‘NSOs were left to fend for themselves. Sport ran its own affairs, found its own resources, and established its own values’. Moreover, Booth and Tatz (2000, p. 163) argue that sport at this time was viewed as a ‘purely private affair’. However, during the 1980s the Australian federal government began to take a far more interventionist approach in respect of the management and governance of NGBs.

Increasing government influence

A decisive moment for Australian sport in general, and a precursor to the shift toward greater government intervention, was the failure of the country’s athletes to win any gold medals at the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games, and winning just five medals overall. The clearest manifestation of the government’s increased interest in sport was the political and financial support that underpinned the creation of the elite-focused Australian Institute of Sport in 1981 and the subsequent establishment of the Australian Sports Commission in 1985 (cf. Collins and Green, 2007). The decision in 1993 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to award the 2000 Olympic Games to Sydney further tightened the relationship between the government and NGBs. Elite sport, especially Olympic sport, was becoming too important to be left solely in the hands of NGBs.

The IOC’s decision had a profound effect on the pace and direction of federal sport policy administration and funding allocations; a decision, moreover, that further strengthened the elite-sport lobby in Australia. The award of the 2000 Olympic Games provided the catalyst for a six year (up to 2000) elite development program that included additional monies for elite athletes under the Olympic Athlete Programme. The Olympic Athlete Programme, as a funding stream, is a pertinent indication of the ways in which the government increasingly shaped the conditions within which NGBs operated during the 1990s. During this period, the ‘unchallengeable principle of accountability’ (Australian Sports Commission, 1999, p. 17) emerged as a far more explicit underlying standard in the Sports Commission’s relationship with NGBs. As Stewart et al. (2004, p. 74) argue, the ‘government preference for economic rationalism and managerialism … signall[ed] to sporting bodies that funding for elite athlete development was contingent upon improving management systems, and delivering medals and trophies’.

A somewhat under-analysed fault line running through this increasingly centralised relationship, however, was the relative failure to balance the Australian Sports Commission’s twin objectives of promoting mass participation / sports development activity and elite sport; a fault line perhaps best summarised by a Task Force review of government involvement in sport and recreation in Australia:
There was a general consensus among sporting organisations and individuals with whom the Task Force met that the participation area has been a low pri¬ority of the ASC [Australian Sports Commission] and that this is reflected in the low levels of funding to achieve participation objectives. (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999, p. 88 )
This fault line is at the heart of divisions within the athletics community in Australia (cf. Elliot, 2004; Roe, 2002). Elliot (2004, p. 7) for example, argues that ‘the sport … projects an image of elitism that undermines its ability to attract significant numbers of grassroots participants to its ranks and that, therefore, there are ‘concerns about a lack of inclusiveness within the sport’. Part of our analysis, then, in the following section problematises the ways in which the overarching elite objectives sought by the government over many years might have resulted in this lack of inclusiveness in the sport. Speaking more generally, but with a particular resonance for our analysis of Athletics Australia (and for UK Athletics), Rose (2000) notes how government has undertaken ‘rationalised and calculated interventions that have attempted to govern the existence and experience of contemporary human beings, and to act upon human conduct to direct it to certain ends’ (p. 322). Of particular relevance, then, to our ensuing analysis of Athletics Australia are the ways in which the language of rationality and technocracy emerged increasingly to frame the construction of the sports development discourse in Australia.

Athletics Australia

Athletics Australia is the national body for the athletics disciplines of track and field, cross-country, road running, and race walking. All states and territories are linked to the national body as Member Associations, and the NGB is part of the Australian Athletics Federation, an umbrella group that brings together seven key athletics authorities in the country, including the Australian Track and Field Coaches Association. One of the defining characteristics then of Athletics Australia’s remit is its organisational complexity, which has led to expressions of concern, particularly by government, regarding the capacity of the NGB to govern the sport effectively. Indeed, in March 2004, it was announced by the government that athletics was to be subject to a wide-ranging investigation by the Australian Sports Commission because ‘the present criticism being levelled at the sport indicated the need for a more comprehensive review as to the best way to take the sport forward’ (Department of Communications, Information Technology, and the Arts, 2004). The review was chaired by one of the country’s former top athletes, Herb Elliot, and the subsequent highly critical report, published in July 2004, made ‘128 recommendations for improvement’ (Elliot, 2004, p. 8) after its damning assessment of the NGB’s organisational and managerial capacities.

Concerns for the organisation and administration of the sport were not new, however. Indeed, Elliot (2004, p. 7) noted that ‘in the past 20 years there have been at least five reviews into athletics in Australia’; the sport thus appears to have suffered a spiral of decline from its heyday in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Phillips, 2000). Three enduring themes emerge from these reviews, all of which have a bearing on the contemporary condition of the sport in Australia: a) jurisdictional divisions, especially between federal and NGB and State and Territory organisations; b) the strength of emphasis on the elite levels of the sport; and c) the organisational capacity of Athletics Australia to manage the many and various sectoral interests involved in the sport, most notably Little Athletics, the body responsible for younger people up to sixteen or seventeen years of age (for more detail, see Green and Houlihan, 2005).

The broader political backdrop to the current ‘condition’ of athletics reveals that the government is more than willing to intervene into the workings of NGBs, in general, and those that were/are deemed as ‘failing’, in particular (cf. Australian Sports Commission, 1999; Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). Athletics Australia evidently falls into the last category (Australian Sports Commission, 2002; Hoye, 2003). Therefore, what is very clear in the Australian context is that despite claims by the Hawke/Keating governments of the 1980s and 1990s that ‘the economy in general had to be de-regulated and privatised to make it internationally competitive, they effectively did the opposite with sport’ (Stewart et al., 2004, pp. 69–70). Moreover, as Stewart et al. observe, ‘The ASC [Australian Sports Commission] in effect became a planning and regulatory agency for sport by setting performance guidelines and operational parameters in return for ongoing funding and support for NSOs [NGBs]’ (p. 70). The Task Force review of Commonwealth Government involvement in sport and recreation argued that NGBs face a range of management issues in seeking to achieve increased participation levels, including ‘a declining financial base, fewer volunteers, and declining membership at senior competition level’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999, p. 86). At the elite level, the Task Force review stated that NGBs ‘participate in an intricate global environment against sophisticated rivals who often have greater resources and lower costs’ (p. 105). Importantly, then, as Hoye (2003, pp. 212-13) observes, ‘The rationale for government in seeking to improve the management and governance of NSOs [NGBs] therefore lies in improving their ability to deliver the outcomes expected of them in return for receiving government funding’.

It appears, then, that the ‘large hand’ of government circumscribes the activities of Australian NGBs despite the Task Force review recognising that ‘it should be sport, not government, that runs sport’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999, p. 104). Hoye (2003, p. 213) highlights two important reasons why power will remain largely concentrated at the centre: continued public funding of NGBs is dependent upon them demonstrating that government funding is ‘well utilised’, and the government needs to ensure that NGBs are well placed in order to support its ‘sport policy initiatives in the areas of elite and mass participation sport’ (p. 213). It is clear that the political rationalities and programs of the federal government have focused on the former to the detriment of the latter. Indeed, a senior official at the Australian Sports Commission stated that government and the Sports Commission have only recently acknowledged the need to ‘redress the imbalance between high performance and grassroots sport’ (Interview, 5 June 2003). At the NGB level, a senior Athletics Australia official conceded that the organisation’s ‘almost total’ focus on elite sport has been a ‘fundamental weakness within the organisation’, and one that has yet to be fully addressed (Interview, 4 June 2003). The government’s ‘discourse of control’ (Raco and Imrie, 2000, p. 2197) has clearly shaped the conduct of NGBs toward a bureaucratic, technical, and rational control system for elite sport. Under these conditions, the Australian ‘sport environment has been created not by athletes but by administrators and, as such, becomes subject to controlling managerial interests’ (Hoye, 2003, p. 216).

The shift toward a managerialist and technocratic culture, in particular the process of formalising, institutionalising, and professionalising the governance of NGBs, has been driven by the government and administered through the Australian Sports Commission’s Governance and Management Improvement Programme (cf. Australian Sports Commission, 2005; Hoye, 2003). The aim of this program is to provide resources for NSOs to address ‘their specific [emphasis added] governance issues’ (Hoye, 2003, p. 215). Thus, the individualised ethos of neoliberal politics, in particular the notion of ‘responsible autonomy’ (Dean, 1999, p. 210), underscores the program’s rationale. It is also clear that on the one hand this program is encouraging empowerment. On the other hand, however, it can be seen as operationalising ‘the self-governing capacities of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives’ (Dean, 1999, p. 67). What is conspicuous about the case of Athletics Australia is that, despite all Australian NGBs ‘being under increased performance scrutiny, particularly in achieving the outcomes from government funding’ (Ryan, 2002, p. 1), the sport has failed to increase its ‘relatively low participation base … [and] Australian athletes struggle to attain and sustain international excellence’ (Stewart et al., 2004, p. 102). In particular, the NGB has not delivered on the government’s overriding policy objective, namely the achievement of medals at the sport’s blue-ribbon event – the Olympic Games. Over the past five Olympic Games (1988-2004), Australian athletes have won just two gold medals.

The Australian Sports Commission (2002, p. 1) cites the ‘significant structural change’ undertaken by Athletics Australia in the late 1990s as a case study of good practice and as one element of its advice under the Governance and Management Improvement Programme for other NGBs facing similar problems as the sport of athletics. The Australian Sports Commission articulated those problems as ‘a lack of consistency and solidarity within the existing structure, particularly from the State/Territory Member Associations towards the national body’; the lack of money for the sport and the organisation; and that the NGB ‘had not been realising its potential for years’ (Ryan, 2002, p. 1). Athletics Australia’s response to these problems is indicative of the shift to a managerialist and technocratic culture, namely, the appointment of a corporate board based on relevant business skills replacing the old model that was representative of the organisational membership. The language of the corporate world now pervades the rhetoric of the organisation’s CEO: ‘We apply basic business principles to everything that we do … and exploit all opportunities open to us’ (quoted in Ryan, p. 1). Somewhat paradoxically, the problem with this approach is captured within the Australian Sports Commission’s (2002, p. 4) case study of Athletics Australia, which states:
The two boards are observed to have been starkly different, and operating on different ends of the spectrum of board responsibilities: the old board had strong ‘athletic’ skills, but shortcomings in commercial matters, the new board has strong commercial skills, but is seen as not adequately empathising with its athletic stakeholders.
Even more remarkably, given the noted long-standing problems regarding (the lack of) inclusiveness within the sport, the Australian Sports Commission (2002, p. 4) concludes that Athletics Australia ‘now needs to give consideration to how it can forge improved linkages with the sport’s grass roots’.

Conclusions

Part of the explanation for the lack of managerial and administrative efficiency and effectiveness in Australian athletics resonates with Rose’s (1999, p. 146) elaboration of disciplinary practices in which government can act indirectly upon ‘autonomous entities’ (in our case, NGBs) by ‘focusing upon results: setting targets, promulgating standards, monitoring outputs, allocating budgets [and] undertaking audits’. Such practices have palpably failed on all counts in this case, with neither the government realising a return on its funding investment across a range of sport policy objectives – most noticeably at the elite level – nor Athletics Australia managing to engender a culture of inclusiveness because communication and interaction with grassroots members and volunteers has been manifestly inadequate (cf. Elliot, 2004).

References

Australian Sports Commission (1999). Beyond 2000. Canberra: Australian Sports Commission.
Australian Sports Commission (2002). The governance of athletics in Australia: A case study summary. Available online: http://www.ausport.gov.au/ibp/athleticscasestudy.pdf (Accessed 30 March 2005).
Australian Sports Commission (2005). Sport innovation and best practice – Governance and business management. Available online: http://www.ausport.gov.au/ibp/gmip.asp (Accessed 5 April 2005).
Booth, D., and Tatz, C. (2000). One-eyed: A View of Australian Sport. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
Collins, S. and Green, M. (2007). The Australian Institute of Sport. Dialogue: Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, 26(2): 4-14.
Commonwealth of Australia (1999). Shaping Up: A Review of Commonwealth Involvement in Sport and Recreation in Australia (Sport 2000 Task Force). Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia.
Dean, M. (1999). Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage.
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (2004). Wide-ranging review into athletics [Media release]. Available online: www.dcita.gov.au/Printer_Friendly/0,,0_5-2_4009-4_117978-LIVE_1 (Accessed 3 March 2004).
Elliot, H. (2004). Re-creating a Culture for Athletics in Australia: A Report into the High Performance, Development and Governance of Athletics in Australia (Prepared for the Australian Sports Commission and Athletics Australia). Canberra: Australian Sports Commission.
Green, M., and Houlihan, B. (2005). Elite Sport Development: Policy Learning and Political Priorities. London: Routledge.
Hoye, R. (2003). The role of the state in sport governance: An analysis of Australian government policy. Annals of Leisure Research, 6(3), 209-221.
Phillips, M. (2000). From Sidelines to Centrefield: A History of Sports Coaching in Australia. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.
Raco, M., and Imrie, R. (2000). Governmentality and rights and responsibilities in urban policy. Environment and Planning A, 32(12), 2187-2204.
Roe, B. (2002). The State of Domestic Athletics Competition in Australia. Melbourne: Athletics Australia.
Rose, N. (1999). Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rose, N. (2000). Government and control. British Journal of Criminology, 40(2), 321-339.
Ryan, C. (2002). Sporting bodies urged to practice good governance. Available online: http://www.ausport.gov.au/ibp/governanceurge.pdf (Accessed 30 March 2005).
Stewart, B., Nicholson, M., Smith, A., and Westerbeek, H. (2004). Australian Sport: Better by Design? The Evolution of Australian Sport Policy. London: Routledge.

Selected Websites

Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS): http://www.culture.gov.uk/default.htm
UK Sports Council (UK Sport): http://www.uksport.gov.uk/
UK Athletics: http://www.ukathletics.net/
Department of Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA): http://www.dcita.gov.au/home
Australian Sports Commission (ASC): http://www.ausport.gov.au/
Athletics Australia: http://www.athletics.com.au/